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There is sigh of relief across Europe after the BVerfG has rejected the injunction
order by the plaintiffs against the Own Resources Decision. But a decision by the
French Conseil d’Etat (the highest administrative court) taken on the same day might
be the far more important political decision.
Indeed, the decision by the BVerfG considers that the cost of blocking the agreement
far exceeds the risks (including for the international reputation of the German
Government).
However, this is not a ruling on the substance of the matter, it is only a decision on
the injunction. The Court is still liable (and likely) to refer the case to the ECJ and this
could play an important role in future debates to expand and extend the Recovery
and Resilience Facility.
It is therefore fair to assume, despite this positive development, that we still have not
crossed the Hamiltonian Rubicon and that the legal and political struggle for the RRF
to become a permanent mechanism is only starting. This time however, it is quite
possible that the ECJ could side with the BVerfG and consider that the legal basis
under which the RRF was built is unsuitable to make it a permanent mechanism.
On the debates regarding the legal basis used for the RRF and what lies ahead see
here and here.
But the more important decision this week is that of the French Conseil d’Etat, which
was ruling following a referral to the ECJ. The case is rather simple: the French
security services are mandating sweeping collection of personal connection data
to internet providers and telecommunication operators in violation of the e-privacy
directive. The ECJ has considered in its October 2020 ruling that this practice was
not only violating the directive but also violating the EU’s Charter of Fundamental
Rights.
Following the ECJ ruling, the French Government doubled down and asked through
its General Secretariat of the Government to challenge the European Court of
Justice and to possibly follow two legal avenues to mount this challenge:
• Consider the ECJ as acting ultra vires, thereby effectively take the rather
confrontational line of adjudicating on a matter of European Law (in a similar
fashion to what the BVerfG did in its PSPP ruling).
• Claim that this decision was creating a conflict with the French Constitutional
order and that these provisions were undermining France’s constitutional
identity.
In its conclusions, the Rapporteur Public (equivalent to the Advocate General before
the CJEU) has raised a number of quite fundamental questions including the conflict
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between the Constitutional obligation for the government to ensure national security
and the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. Interestingly, the Rapporteur Public
raised the possibility to refer the case to the French Constitutional Court potentially
cementing the view that France’s Constitutional identity and its mandate to the
government to provide security was imperative and unreconcilable with the EU’s
Charter of Fundamental Rights.
In its decision, the Conseil d’Etat chose both a less confrontational course than the
BVerfG by refusing to consider the ECJ ruling ultra vires, a decision welcomed by
Jacques Ziller and many legal scholars, but it also chose to create more assertive
and confrontational objection to the Court’s ruling which could have very profound
and long lasting consequences on the EU’s legal and political order, something that
has been largely unreported.
Indeed, the French Court goes further than the BVerfG by openly resisting the
application of EU law. The BVerfG had paved the way for such action in its ultra
vires ruling against the PSPP but the German Government and the Bundesbank
effectively held back and never effectively disobeyed European law and the ECJ
ruling. In this case, the French Government will indeed reject EU law for an extended
(and potentially unlimited) period of time.
First, in the case at hand by defying the ruling of the CJEU, the Conseil d’Etat
disregards key elements of the ruling that it referred to the CJEU. This open
confrontation is a very important precedent that stands in sharp contrast with the
decision of the Belgian Constitutional Court taken the day after that complied with
the ECJ’s ruling by mandating to strike down the Belgian data collection law.
Second and perhaps more importantly, the French administrative supreme court is,
without formally referring to, abusing a legal route akin to what the BVerfG undertook
with its 1986 Solange Ruling, where it effectively considered that in the absence of
Fundamental Rights and Civil Liberties being protected by the European Court of
Justice, the German Constitutional Court reserved the right to rule against the EU to
protect the German Constitutional Identity and the protection of fundamental rights.
The 1986 German ruling and the tension it created in the EU’s legal order had
an historical importance and eventually led to the adoption of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights 20 years later. France is trying to use this legal precedent
arguing that there are no equivalent security clauses in the EU’s primary law and
therefore that France’s constitutional identity warrants protection until the EU’s
primary law does empower the EU on internal security matters – a securitarian
Solange.
Indeed, the Conseil d’Etat has created a double lock, not only it will allow the
Government to continue its surveillance program until the EU is endowed with
security provisions in its primary law, but it will also keep its option opens if these
provisions are deemed insufficient. This is effectively creating the domestic legal
ground for a permanent confrontation between the EU and the French legal order in
the field of security.
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Furthermore, it is striking that the Conseil d’Etat decided not only to consider public
order and security as forming part of France’s Constitutional identity (something
that neither the constituent, nor the legislator has done), but more importantly that
it gave such a loose and vague definition to national security: “safeguard of the
Nation’s fundamental interest, the prevention to threats to public order, breaches
to security of persons and goods, fight against terrorism and investigations against
penal offence”. With such a definition of public order and national security, France
can oppose virtually any piece of European legislation.
The BVerfG was often dubbed, the Court that barks but does not bite. The French
judges might well be judges who bite by stealth. Indeed, this legal precedent is
potentially historical.
The glass half-full take of this event is that France is pushing through a legal
challenge for a real leap in integration in internal security matters. This seems in line
with the political strategy pursued by the French government in Brussels where it
is currently lobbying to amend both the Charter and secondary EU law, possibly to
create an equal protection for security matter at the EU level.
The glass half-empty view is that this challenge is effectively creating a precedent
of opposition between national constitutional order and the Charter of Fundamental
Rights, which is likely to have serious consequences across Europe and in particular
in Poland, Hungary and elsewhere.
Germany’s Solange case used Germany’s Constitutional identity to establish a
charter of fundamental rights in the EU and strengthen the kernel of the EU’s
constitutional order. France’s Conseil d’Etat ruling might be the first step of its
undoing. It might also be a turning point in a battle of the judges which has been
fairly civil over the last 50 years has shaped the EU’s legal and political order. By
openly challenging the EU’s legal order both in its form (the ruling), as well as in its
substance (the Charter of Fundamental Rights), France might be doing both: paving
the way for further weakening of the Rule of Law across the EU, and it might also
pave the way for more challenges coming from France on other issues so much
so that French Constitutional Lawyer Paul Cassia referred to the ruling as akin
to a “Frexit”. Given the stakes, the European Commission will be key. In order to
avoid setting a disastrous precedent, the European Commission could trigger an
infringement against France. It might also consider it politically expedient to do so at
the same time against Germany after the Karlsruhe PSPP ruling, demonstrating at
this critical time that it won’t be impressed even by the biggest Member States and
that it is prepared to meet force with force.
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